The role of ideology in disagreements among economists. A Quantitative Analisis: by Thomas Mayer
 
THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN DISAGREEMENT6S AMONG ECONOMISTS 






How justified is the charge that ideology strongly influences the allegedly objective 
opinions of economists? An analysis of a new survey of AEA members and of surveys by 
Fuchs et al of labor economists and public economists shows that value judgments and 
judgments about the government's efficacy have some influence on the way economists 
think about what should be purely economic issues. But such influence is not strong 
enough to explain much of the disagreement among economists.  
 
 
 THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN DISAGREEMENTS AMONG ECONOMISTS: 
A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
Thomas Mayer* 
 
Economics has long labored under the charge that is primarily ideology dressed in 
the garb of science - or at the least that it is heavily influenced by the ideological 
preferences of its practitioners. And it is not only outsiders and the heterodox who make 
this charge. Thus, in discussing stabilization policy Franco Modigliani (1977, p. 10) 
wrote that: "there is no question, but that value judgments play a major role in the 
differences between economists ... value judgments end up by playing a role in your 
assessment of parameters and the evidence we consider." Similarly, according to James 
Tobin (1976, p. 336): "Distinctively monetarist policy recommendations stem less from 
theoretical or even empirical findings than from distinctive value judgments". On the 
other hand, Milton Friedman (1953, p. 5) has argued that disagreements about economic 
policy among disinterested citizens are predominantly due to disagreements about 
positive economics, and not to disagreements about values. 
  It is not irrational for economists to allow their ideological preferences to 
influence their policy preferences. Economists, like others, may benefit from advocating 
certain policies because of a prior attachment to them, or because people whose good 
opinion they value tend to prefer those who agree with their policy preferences, or 
because advocating certain policies allows them to believe that they are good and caring 
(or else hard-headed, realistic) persons. And accommodating one's reading of the 
evidence on certain parameter values sometimes makes it easier to adjust one's policy 
views. The cost of allowing such considerations to influence one's thinking is the 
discomfort that accompanies the suppression of the knowledge that one is being less than honest and forthright. Rational behavior requires that such benefits and costs be balanced 
at the margin.1 
  Recently Victor Fuchs, Alan Krueger and James Porterba (1998) used an opinion 
survey of labor economists and public economists to study empirically the influence of 
ideology in economics.  They conclude that the relation between value judgments and 
policy preferences is "much stronger" than is the relation between the relevant economic 
parameters and policy choices, and that value preferences have a statistically significant, 
though small, effect on economist's estimates of economic parameters (Fuchs et al, 1998, 
p. 1401).  Like them I show in this paper a small effect of value judgments on parameter 
estimates, but quantify it in more detail than they do. For example, except when using the 
variable they construct to measure liberal values, their paper records the correlations and 
the percentage of significant coefficients without reference to whether the sign of these 
coefficients corresponds to any expected liberal-conservative distinction. In contrast, this 
paper uses an explicit liberal -conservative dichotomy, and treats as successes for the 
ideological- bias hypotheses only those significant coefficients whose signs are consistent 
with this dichotomy. It also distinguishes a weak version of the ideological-bias 
hypothesis that the data accept from a strong version that they reject. It further shows 
that, at least for the questions discussed here, differences in judgments about the efficacy 
of government policies influence parameter estimates at least as much, if not more, than 
do value judgments. To do this it uses along with the Fuchs et al data a new opinion 
survey of academic economists devised specifically (as the Fuchs et al survey was not) to 
address the question of ideological bias.   But before turning to the new data one needs to see what is meant by calling 
economics ideological, what testable hypotheses are implied by this charge, and consider 
some problems in testing them with survey data. 
I. Value Judgments and Ideology 
There is no need to consider all the ramifications of the complex sociological 
concept of ideology. The core of the charge that economics is ideological is that in 
developing their theories and interpreting their empirical evidence economists are if not 
dominated then at least strongly biased by their extra-scientific value judgments or 
political judgments. Such value judgments are not limited to the relative weights attached 
to the utilities of different persons, but include other value judgments, such as the 
importance of freedom from government control, and the importance of justice relative to 
economic growth. 
  Since the adjective "ideological" is often used as the antithesis to "objective and 
scientific" it is useful to include in it not only value judgments, but also the many broad 
positive presumptions about the political process that are often needed to select an 
economic policy.2 Many of them are treated rigorously within a sub-field of economics, 
public choice theory; but even so, these issues are still on the periphery of economics, 
and if economists cannot agree on them this is not as great a challenge to the claim that 
economics is a science as is disagreement on more central issues. This also holds for the 
effect of economic policies on the political and social systems, a problem usually not 
discussed systematically by economists, because it raises too many issues that belong 
more to political science and sociology.  Hence ideology is defined here in a particular way that includes propositions that for political science or sociology would be positive, 
non-ideological statements. 
  Differentiating between disagreements on positive political issues and on issues 
that belong entirely to economics has a major benefit. It allows one to see whether the 
former can explain some of the disagreement among economists about policy issues that 
has hurt the public reputation of economics. The fact that on many policy issues it is 
possible to marshall an impressive roster of economists on either side does not speak 
against the scientific status of economics if their differences are due to disagreements 
about either positive political issues or normative issues.3 
  To discuss ideological bias one needs to distinguish between at least two 
divergent ideological positions, such as liberalism and conservatism. Since these terms 
are vague I define conservatives as those who are more disposed than liberals to rely on 
market processes.  More specifically, Tables 1 and 2 show for each question which 
responses are here treated as conservative and which as liberal. Readers who disagree 
with these classifications can use their own classifications to reinterpret the results shown 
in the subsequent tables. 
II. Testable Implications 
One implication of the claim that ideology and not objective evidence determines which 
economic theories and the empirical evidence economists accept is that those economists 
who hold liberal (or conservative) opinions on one economic parameter with strong 
ideological implications, such as the prevalence of market power, also hold liberal (or 
conservative) opinions on other ideologically charged parameters. This can be tested by  Table 1 
Responses to the AEA Survey 
 
  Mean  S.D.  N 
1. Suppose technical change would  raise the level of 
output permanently by 2%, but would cause a totally 
arbitrary 5% redistribution within each income decile, 
while leaving the distribution between quintiles 
unchanged. Would you favor this development? [Strongly 
favor ... Strongly disfavor]
a  1.9  1.0  142 
 
2. Whether GDP grows at 1.5% or 2%  is not nearly as 
 important as enhancing social justice. (C)  3.3  1.4  152 
 
3. The government has a moral right to redistribute 
income if a majority supports this. (C)  2.9  1.6  156 
 
4. Maintaining or preferably enhancing freedom from 
government control should be the main goal of economic 
policy (L)  3.1  1.4  161 
 
5. While it is hard to generalize about the many 
government programs involved, by and large, if the 
government adopts a program to help the lowest 
income quintile I would expect that roughly speaking 
-- % of the benefits would go to the upper half of the 
income distribution instead of the lowest quintile. (C)  46.4  24.4  78 
 
6. In general, the law of unanticipated consequences 
ensures that most programs that are intended to help 
the poor harm them more than they help them. (L)  03.2  1.3  95 
 
7. Government intervention that would substantially 
reduce the inequality of the income distribution would 
have major social and political effects. On the whole, 
these effects would be [Strongly detrimental .. Strongly 
favorable] (L)  3.0  1.4  150 
 
8. A $50 billion rise in government expenditures with 
no accompanying change in the money supply is more 
expansionary over a 5 year period than is a $50 billion 
increase in the money supply with no change in fiscal 
policy. (C)   3.2  1.4  119 
 
9. A 10 percent cut across the board in income tax rates 
would substantially increase work effort. (L)  3.6  1.2  158  
10. Product markets in the U.S. are better described as 
competitive than oligopolistic, (L)  2.5  1.2  164 
 
11. Speculation in foreign exchange markets is 
beneficial because it is usually stabilizing rather than 
destabilizing. (L)  2.7  1.2  137 
 
12. Halving the capital gains tax rate would raise the 
economic growth rate by 0.25 or more. (L)  3.5  1.3  124 
 
13. Financial markets generate serious misallocations of 
resources because stock prices are dominated by short- 
term returns, and long-term consequences tend to be 
neglected. (C)  3.8  1.2  157 
 
14. It is better to aim for a balanced budget over the 
business cycle rather than yearly. (C)  1.6  .9  157 
 
15. Industrial policy(that is government support for 
innovative industries) should not be dismissed out 
of hand, but deserves serious consideration. (C)  3.3  1.4  162 
 
16. An increase in unionization is desirable. (C)  3.6  1.2  161 
 
17. Trade in human organs for transplants should be 
permitted. (L)  3.0  1.5  150 
 
18. Government spending as a percent of GDP should be 
reduced. (L)  2.8  1.4  156 
 
19. The prime concern of macropolicy should be to hold 
down inflation. (L)  2.9  1.3  160 
 
20. Compared to the current situation, the federal 
government's role in the income distribution should be 
[Larger .. Smaller] (C)  3.0  1.4  160 
 
 
Note: Unless otherwise indicated the respondents were presented with five 
boxes ranging from : "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree".  The letter 
in parenthesis indicates whether it is conservatives or liberals who are 
assumed to assign a high value to this parameter when measured on a scale 
ranging from "strongly oppose" to "strongly favor". 
 
a. Responses cannot be classified as conservative or liberal. Table 2 
 
Condensed Versions of the Questions in Surveys of Specialists 
 
 
A.  Values - Labor Economists and Public Economists 
 
Does the government play too large or too small a role in income 
  redistribution? (L) [1-v] 
Same as the previous question on the assumption the that redistribution 
  would have no distortionary effects. (L) [2-v] 
Should policy place more weight on equity or on efficiency than it does 
  now?  (C) [3-v] 
Should policy give more weight to individual or to social responsibility 
  than it does now? (L) [4-v] 
 
B.  Economic Parameters - Labor Economists 
 
Total wage elasticity of labor demand? (C) [1-l] 
Output constant wage elasticity of labor demand? (C) [2-l] 
Percent impact on earnings of youths of JTPA job training? (L) [3-l] 
Percent impact on earnings of adult males of JTPA job training? (L) 
  [4-l] 
Percent impact on earnings of adult females of JTPA job training? (L) 
  [5-l] 
Uncompensated elasticity of labor supply for men aged 25-54? (C) [6-l] 
Uncompensated elasticity of labor supply for women aged 25-54? (C) [7-l] 
Compensated elasticity of labor supply for men aged 25-54? (C) [8-l] 
Compensated elasticity of labor supply for women aged 25-54? (C) [9-l] 
Percent impact of unions on the earnings of their members? (L) [10-l] 
Percent of male-female wage gap due to employer discrimination? (L) [11] 
 
C.  Economic Parameters - Public Economists 
 
Change in the GDP growth rate if all capital income taxes were replaced 
  by a revenue-neutral wage tax? (C) [1-p] 
Uncompensated  elasticity of labor supply for men aged 25-54? (C) [2-p] 
Compensated elasticity of labor supply for men aged 25-54? (C) [3-p] 
Percent of inflows to IRA's that are net additions to saving? (C) [4-p] 
Personal saving ratio in the absence of Social Security? (C) [5-p] 
Ratio of administrative costs of mandatory private retirement accounts 
  to the administrative costs of Social Security? (L) [6-p] 
 
D.  Policy Recommendations- Labor Economistsa 
 
Increase AFDC benefits financed by a proportional increase in marginal   income tax rates. (L) [12-l] 
Eliminate the OASI cap on  taxable wages, offset by a revenue-neutral 
  reduction in payroll tax rates (L) [13-l] 
Eliminate the OFCCP Affirmative Action Program (C) [14-l] 
Increase the minimum wage from $4.25 to $5.15 over two years (L) [15-l] 
Eliminate the federal role in job training programs and apply the 
  savings to debt reduction. (C) [16-1] 
Change the law to permit workers to form union if a majority of workers 
  in the bargaining unit sign cards. (L)  [17-7] 
 
E.  Policy Recommendations - Public Economistsa 
 
Increase AFDC benefits financed by a proportional increase in marginal 
  income tax rates. (L) [7-p] 
Replace individual and corporate income tax and estate tax with a 
  revenue neutral value-added tax. (C) [8-p] 
Eliminate the cap on taxable wages under OASI with an offsetting 
  reduction in the payroll tax rate. (C) [9-p] 
Raise the maximum IRA contribution to $5000 and restore "up front" tax 
  deductions of IRA contributions for everyone. (C) [10-p] 
Replace part of the current payroll tax with a mandatory self-directed 
  savings program, annuitized at retirement. (C) [11-p] 
 
 
NOTE: These are summaries of the questions. For the complete questions 
see Fuchs et al (1998) The letter in parenthesis indicates whether it is 
conservatives or liberals who are assumed to assign a high value to this 
parameter when measured on a scale ranging from "strongly oppose" to 
"strongly favor" on the policy questions, and  from "much less" to "much 
greater" on the value questions (except for question 4-v where the range 
is from "individual responsibility" to "public responsibility.") The 
symbol in brackets is the designation used for this question in the 
subsequent tables. 
 
a. Choices ranged from "strongly oppose" to "strongly favor".` 
 
Source: Fuchs et al (1998) pp. 1416-23. 
 
 looking for correlations in the responses to questions specifically chosen so that --  
although there is an ideological connection between them -- neither economic theory nor 
empirical evidence provide any reason why a respondent who answers one question in a 
certain way should also answer another question in a certain way. For example, an 
ideological preference for minimizing government intervention provides an incentive to 
believe both that speculation in foreign exchange markets is stabilizing, and also that the 
supply elasticity of labor, and hence the deadweight costs of taxes, are high. If 
economists form their beliefs about such economic parameters purely objectively, then, 
ignoring sampling and response errors, the correlation between the responses to these two 
questions should be zero, while if their responses are entirely dominated by ideology it 
should be unity. This makes it possible to quantify the degree of objectivity. 
  A related implication is that respondents' value judgments and judgments about 
government efficacy can be used to predict their decisions about economic parameters; 
for example, that those who believe that the government has no right to redistribute 
income also believe that the elasticity of the labor supply with respect to income-tax rates 
is high. This allows them to support a ideologically-driven objection to high marginal 
rates with a positive argument in case their normative argument is questioned, either by 
themselves or by others. 
  A third implication of the ideological-bias hypothesis is that through their effects 
on estimates of economic parameters ideological biases largely determine, or at least 
heavily influence economists' policy choices. But this implication cannot be readily 
tested because value judgments and judgments about government efficacy play a 
legitimate and indeed necessary role in policy choices. As an extreme case suppose that economics were to achieve such rigor and objectivity that all economists agree on all 
positive aspects of economic policy.  Then, all policy disagreements among economists 
would have to be due to differences in value judgments or judgments about government 
efficacy. Hence, the correlation between ideological preferences and policy choices that 
Fuchs et al (1998) point to is not an adequate test of the objectivity of economics, though 
it is relevant for other issues.   
  Few would claim that ideological differences account for all the disagreements 
among economists, while few would deny that they play at least a trivial role. A 
meaningful test of the ideological-bias hypothesis therefore needs specific criteria.  
Accordingly, I test two quantifications of this hypothesis. One, the "weak" version claims 
that in tests of the just discussed testable implications two conditions hold in the majority 
of the simple regressions.  The first condition is different for the intercorrelations of the 
economic parameter variables and for the other type of correlations shown in Table 3. For 
the former it is that at least 7.5 percent of the significant coefficients (at the 5 percent 
level) have the right sign. For the latter it is that at least 7.5 percent of the significant 
coefficients have the right sign even when the significant coefficients with the wrong sign 
are subtracted from those with the right sign.  
  The second  condition is that - when the variables are measured in the same units - 
the mean absolute value of the correctly signed regression coefficients equals or exceeds 
0.15. This second requirement applies only to simple and not to multiple regressions. For 
the latter it is replaced by the requirement that in more than one third of the regressions at 
least 67 percent of all the regression coefficients have the right sign. Although it would be preferable to use only at significant coefficients in this test, there are too few of them 
for this to be a meaningful test.  
  All regression coefficients can be significant and exceed 0.15, and yet ideological 
factors may explain only a small proportion of the disagreement among economists. How 
much of the disagreement is due to ideological bias is measured by R2, and not by t 
values, which depend in part on the standard error of the coefficients and hence on the 
sample size. The "strong" version of the ideological-bias hypothesis therefore imposes 
the additional requirement that in simple regressions R2 equals or exceeds 0.33, or that in 
multiple regressions it equals or exceeds 0.50. Essentially, the weak hypothesis is the 
claim that disagreement on ideological issues plays some role in disagreement among 
economists, and the strong hypothesis is the claim that it explains a substantial part of the 
disagreement.  These criteria are, of course, arbitrary, but readers who prefer other 
criteria can see from the data in the subsequent tables whether on their preferred criteria 
the data support either version.4 
III. Qualifications 
The results shown below are subject to several qualifications.  One is that they 
measure the importance of ideology only by its ability to explain differences in the 
opinions of economists and ignore any ideological bias that is shared by the entire 
sample. Presumably all economists agree on the desirability of Pareto improvements. 
That is a value judgment, and hence ideological, but since it is a shared judgment it 
explains none of the disagreements. Another problem is that the surveys did not ask about 
everything that should, in principle, be included in the term "ideology", and hence 
underestimate its role.   A third problem is that in some cases causation may run from an objective 
decision about an economic parameter to an ideological choice since ideology includes 
positive as well as normative elements. For example, someone who is convinced by an 
objective reading of the evidence that in many cases government intervention has proved 
inefficient may form the ideological judgment that we should always rely on market 
processes.  But, while this could perhaps be a problem for a few of the questions in the 
Fuchs et al survey, for the AEA survey this is at most a problem for only one question. 
And even for that question it is a problem only if a belief that product markets are more 
oligopolistic than competitive induces someone to believe that the government has a right 
to redistribute income. In any case, the problem of causality arises only with respect to 
the second of the two tests for ideological bias used here. 
  Another set of problems arises from the familiar limitations of sample surveys. 
Thus, there is no assurance that all respondents thought carefully about their responses, 
and some may even have marked a wrong box by mistake. Such noise skews the results 
against the ideological-bias hypothesis. (See Fuchs et al, 1998) On the other hand, the 
results will be skewed in favor of the ideological-bias hypothesis if those whose thinking 
is more ideological are more willing to respond to surveys, particularly to surveys that 
contain questions about ideology. In addition, the samples are relatively small, 
particularly in the responses to some questions in the Fuchs et al data sets. 
  But two problems that beset many surveys are less salient here.  One is that the 
beliefs of agents may not correspond to their actions. Since this paper deals only with 
beliefs, not actions, that is irrelevant. The second is that the effect a regression attributes 
to a particular regressor may be due to another variable not included in the regression that is correlated with the included regressor. But in determining whether ideology affects the 
choice of economic parameters it does not matter if an effect the regression attributes to a 
particular value judgment is actually due to another value judgment. The excluded-
variable" problem matters only if the excluded variable, though correlated with an 
ideological variable, is itself not ideological.5 
IV. The Data 
The data come from two sources. Although these are not the only available 
surveys of economists' opinions, the other surveys have few, if any questions on 
ideology, or do not quantify the disagreements. 
1. Survey of AEA Members 
One source is a sample of academic economists taken from the 1997 American Economic 
Association Directory. Use of this source probably means that economists teaching in 
small institutions are undersampled. A response rate of almost 35 percent yielded 167 
usable replies.6 Table 1 shows the questions asked and the means and standard deviations 
of the responses which range from 1 to 5, except for question 5 which is scaled from 0 to 
100 percent. Unless otherwise indicated 1 expresses "strong agreement" and 5 "strong 
disagreement". Nine of the questions come from previous opinion surveys of economists, 
but were mostly reworded, sometimes substantially so.7. Unless otherwise indicated in 
Table 1 all questions were accompanies by the following line: 
"Strongly agree [_]----[_]----[_]----[_]----[_] Strongly disagree, Cannot say [_]."8 Nearly 
all the respondents used one of these boxes.9 
  Since questionnaire responses can be powerfully influenced by seemingly trivial 
differences in the wording of a question, it would be futile to try to phrase the type of question asked here in a neutral way. The subsequent tables should therefore be read with 
an eye on the exact wording of the questions. For example, if the wording of question 3 
had been: "The government has no right to impose a progressive income tax to 
redistribute income", instead of the actual: "The government has a moral right to 
redistribute income if a majority supports this", the responses might have been 
significantly different. Similarly, since question 14 asks whether it is better "to aim for" a 
budget that is balanced over the business cycle rather than balanced annually, the 
preponderance of positive answers does not necessarily mean that most economists prefer 
a cyclically to an annually balanced budget; some might perhaps have answered 
positively because they think that an annually balanced budget is a counsel of perfection 
and hence not something to "aim for".  Likewise, since it seems dogmatic to say that 
something should be "dismissed out of hand", question 15, which asks whether industrial 
policy should be so treated, presumably elicits much less opposition to industrial policy 
than does the statement that industrial policy should generally be avoided. But this does 
not matter here. Someone who disagrees with the weak statement is obviously more 
likely than someone who agrees with it, to disagree also with the stronger statement. 
Hence, to see whether there is a correlation between ideological preferences and attitudes 
towards industrial policy it does not matter whether the question about industrial policy is 
asked in a strong or a weak form. 
  The questions asked in this survey had to be less precise than those asked by 
Fuchs et al. Their sample consisted of specialists who are more likely than other 
economists to be able to estimate specific coefficients in labor economics or public 
economics, such as the wage elasticity of labor demand. Other economists are more likely to have formed opinions outside their subfields only about more loosely worded 
questions, such as whether a 10 percent across-the-board cut in income taxes would raise 
work effort "substantially". Moreover, in most cases for a question to be precise it would 
have to specify much detail. For example, question 6 asks whether the law of 
unanticipated consequences ensures that most programs intended to help the poor harm 
them as much or more than they help them. To be precise the question would have to 
specify at the least whether the intention to help the poor is the primary or only a 
subsidiary purpose of the program, whether it is intended to help all the poor or just a 
specific group of poor, and whether it is a federal program. It would also have to quantify 
"most", and specify whether the programs are to be just counted or should be weighted by 
their dollar values. Lengthening the questionnaire in this way would have greatly reduced 
the response rate. What helps to offset the vagueness of the questions is that respondents 
were given five choices. For example, someone who responded with "strongly agree" to 
the statement that most programs that are intended to help the poor do not help them, 
might not have done so under all the circumstances just mentioned. But she is more likely 
to have done so under any specified circumstances than is someone who responded to the 
general question with "disagree". 
  Turning to the individual questions, the first four focus on normative judgments. 
The first asks about the trade-off between horizontal equity and higher income. Although 
this question cannot be put into a liberal or conservative dichotomy it is interesting for 
another reason: it provides more insight into pure value judgments than would a question 
about vertical equity, because vertical equity involves a positive issue, the declining 
marginal utility of income to a greater extent than does a question about horizontal equity. Given the way the term "social justice" is usually interpreted, the second question 
then provides a window into the respondents' concern about vertical equity phrased in a 
way intended to minimize the influence of the positive step that leads from unequal 
income to unequal utility levels.  
  Some economists may believe that less income inequality is desirable, and yet 
oppose redistributive policies because they also believe that the government lacks the 
right to redistribute income, in the same way as someone might desire more effective 
policing, yet oppose giving the police the right to search anyone at will. (See Hausman 
and McPherson, 1996, Ch. 9) Question 3 deals with this issue. Question 4 then asks about 
the salience of another value, freedom from government control.  Normative judgments 
and strictly economic judgments in the traditional sense, are not the only judgments 
required for economic policy-making.10 One needs to look also at the efficiency with 
which the government can implement the recommended policy, the subject of questions 5 
and 6. The next six questions probe disagreements on issues of positive economics, while 
the final seven questions ask about policy preferences. The latter combine to varying 
degrees judgments about economic parameters with normative judgments and judgments 
about the efficiency of the political system. While the former probably play a lesser role 
relative to the latter in the responses to questions 14 and 15 the opposite may well hold 
for questions 10 and 11. 
2. Surveys of Specialists 
The second source consists of two surveys by Fuchs et al (1998) of specialists in 
public economics and labor economics "at 40 leading research universities in the United 
States." (p. 1388).11 Their main purpose appears to be to present the thinking and parameter estimates of well-informed specialists.  Their sample is probably more 
representative of those academic economists who advise policymakers than is the AEA 
sample. But to the extent that academic economists stress their own views in the 
classroom, the AEA sample is probably more representative of what students hear. 
  Table 2 provides a condensed version of those of the Fuchs et al questions that are 
used here. Some of their question are excluded because they do not have clear-cut 
ideological implications, and others because any correlation in the responses could be 
grounded in economic theory or in empirical evidence, and hence cannot provide 
evidence of an ideological bias.12 In addition, many questions in the survey of labor 
economist, have a large common core, such as questions about the effect of a particular 
government job training program on (a) youths, (b) adult males, and (c) adult women. To 
avoid attributing excessive weight to these issues I used as dependent variables only the 
first questions of such sets. 
  In using the Fuchs et al data the size of the regression coefficients cannot be use 
as a test because the estimated parameters are not stated in comparable units, and there 
are no natural units in which they could be restated. Hence, the size of the regression 
coefficients is essentially arbitrary.13 
V. Results 
Tables 3 and 4 summarizes the results, while the Appendix Tables show the 
results for the individual questions.14 Sections A of Tables 3 and 4 give the correlations 
among the economic parameters. In the simple regressions the AEA sample 
unambiguously supports the weak version of the bias hypothesis, with almost three  
 Table 3 
 
Summary of Results for Simple Regressions 
 
 
  Percent of  Mean absolute  Mean 
  Coefficients  value of  Adjusted 
  significant and  significant  R2b 
  with sign:a  coefficients 
  right  wrong  with right 
    sign
a 
 
A.  Economic parameters 
  regressed on each other: 
  AEA sample  73%  0%  .248  .081 
  Labor economists  2  16  --  .011 
  Public economists  14  0  --  .028 
B.  Economic Parameters 
  regressed on 
  ideological variables: 
  AEA samplec  83  0  .259  .107 
  Labor economists  29  12  --  .040 
  Public economists  17  0  --  .026 
C. Ideological variables: 
  regressed on each other: 
  AEA samplec  97  0  .434  .228 
  Labor economists  100  0  --  .650 
  Public economists  100  0  --  .444 
D. Policy variables: 
  regressed on each other: 
  AEA sample  95  0  .413  181 
  Labor economists  77  3  --  .144 





--  denotes not computed because of incommensurability of the variables. 
a.  Significant at the 5 percent level. For labor and public economists denominator of 
the ratio excludes coefficients with a t of zero. 
b.  Excludes simple regressions in which the coefficient has the wrong sign. 
c.  Excludes question 1, and for the mean of coefficients question 5. Table 4 
 




  Percent of regressions  Adjusted 
  in which 67% or more  R2
a 
  of the coefficients 
  have right signs.
a 
 
A.  Economic parameters 
  regressed on each other: 
  AEA sample  67%  263 
  Labor economists  9  .093 
  Public economists  83  .045 
B.  Economic Parameters 
  regressed on ideological variables: 
  AEA samplec  67  .202 
  Labor economists  20  .052 
  Public economists  17  .090 
C.  Ideological variables regressed 
  on each other: 
  AEA sample  100  .396 
  Labor economists  100  .650 
  Public economists  100  .678 
D.  Policy variables regressed 
  on each other: 
  AEA sample  100  .382 
  Labor economists  50  .407 
  Public economists  60  .130 
 
 
a.  Excludes regressions in which more than half the coefficients have the wrong 
sign. 
 
b.  Excludes coefficients with a t value of less than 0.1.   
 
c.  Excludes question 1. quarters of the regression coefficients being significant at the 5 percent level, all with the 
right sign. And their mean is well above the weak version's threshold of 0.15.  The 
multiple regressions, too, support the weak version.  And so do both the simple and 
multiple regressions for public economists. But for labor economists the weak version 
fails in both the simple and multiple regressions. In the former most of the significant 
coefficients have the wrong sign, and in the latter only 9 percent of the regressions meet 
the criterion of the weak version. 
  All three samples concur in rejecting the strong version in both types of 
regressions. In all three sets of simple regressions R2 is less than 0.10, while in the 
multiple regressions it averages 0.263 in the AEA sample and substantially less in the 
specialists samples. Apparently - at least for the parameters that the surveys asked about - 
an inclination to accept ideologically congruous belief is not a major reason for 
disagreements about economic parameters.  
  Sections B of Table 3 and 4 show the results for the second test of the bias 
hypothesis, that economists' choices of economic parameters are correlated with their 
ideological positions. In the simple regressions the AEA sample firmly supports the weak 
version but rejects the strong version. The samples of specialists, too, accept the weak but 
not the strong version. However, the multiple regressions show a different result. Here, 
although the AEA sample again accepts the weak version, the two specialist samples 
reject it in more than three quarters of the cases. 
  In Parts A, B and C of Table 3 the AEA data are more favorable for the weak 
ideological-bias hypothesis than are the data for the specialists, with none of the 
significant coefficients having the wrong sign in the AEA data. This could be due to the specialists being asked narrower, more technical questions, which makes it harder to 
indulge one's ideological preferences. Moreover, in Parts A and D, while the questions 
for the AEA sample were selected to avoid any theoretical or empirical connections 
between them, this is not so for the specialist samples. And in Part A these theoretical and 
empirical connections may have generated responses that are ideologically inconsistent, 
and hence show up as wrong signs in Table 3. 
  In summary, the strong version is rejected in all the cases. The weak version, 
however does better. When tested by the intercorrelations of economic parameters it is 
accepted in 4 of 6 cases. And the same is true when it is tested by the correlation between 
ideological variables and parameter estimates. In terms of the polar versions of the 
ideological-bias hypothesis in which economists' disagreements about parameters is 
either entirely uninfluenced by ideology, or else is entirely determined by ideology, the 
low R2's show that the former is much closer to the truth. 
VI. Explanations 
One reason that might, in principle, account for the weak performance of the bias 
hypothesis is that the evidence on economic parameters is so compelling that economists 
cannot indulge their ideological preferences, even if these preferences are strong. But that 
is implausible. The parameters in question are ones about which there is much 
disagreement. Another potential reason is that the liberal-conservative dichotomy - as it is 
defined here - does not reflect accurately the ideological divide among economists, and 
that if measured more meaningfully ideological differences would account for much 
more of economists' disagreements about parameters, and show much greater ideological 
cohesion in parameter choices. But Parts C of Tables 3 and 4 show that the ideological divide as defined here does exist, and it is doubtful that an alternative measure of 
ideological differences would show stronger results. (At the same time the R2's of Tables 
3 and 4 also show that cohesion among the responses to the ideological questions is 
surprisingly low: contrary to some popular complaints, American economists do not 
adhere to strict ideological party lines.15)  
  A more credible explanation is that economists do not have a powerful incentive 
to favor parameter estimates that correspond to their ideological preferences, because 
their parameter choices do relatively little to constrain them in supporting polices that 
correspond to their ideological predispositions. For example, suppose someone accepts a 
high estimate of the income elasticity of the labor supply. He or she may still advocate a 
highly progressive income tax, by attributing great importance to reducing income 
inequality. Similarly, someone might believe that exchange rate speculation is largely 
destabilizing, and yet oppose government intervention in this market in the belief that the 
government cannot intervene efficiently. 
  Two parameter questions in the surveys have a relatively close link to two policy 
questions, and can therefore be used to illustrate the independence of policy choices from 
parameter choices. One, in the AEA survey, asked whether a 10 percent cut in income tax 
rates would substantially increase work effort. The corresponding policy question asked 
whether government spending as a percent of GDP should be reduced. R2 between the 
responses is only 0.36. The other parameter question (in the public economists survey) 
asks about the proportion of inflows into IRA's that represent net additions to savings. 
The corresponding policy question asked about raising the limits on IRA contributions. 
Here R2 is even lower, 0.10. A comparison of Parts A and D of Tables 3 and 4 provides an additional indication that parameter estimates do not strongly constrain policy 
positions. Except in the multiple regressions for public economists (where the results are 
equivocal) the positions taken on policy show a more consistent cleavage along the 
liberal - conservative spectrum than do the positions taken on parameters. 
VII. Value Judgments and Judgments about Government Efficacy 
Ideology as defined here includes judgments about government efficacy as well as 
normative judgments. Table 5 shows the relative importance of these two types of 
judgments by regressing the responses to the economic parameter questions and policy 
questions on two compound variables, C1 and C2, that represent a conservative ideology. 
The first is the mean of the value-judgment variables (variables 2, 3 and variable 4 with 
its sign reversed), and the latter is the mean (with sign reversed) of the efficacy variables 
(variables 6 and 7). In the simple regressions all regression coefficients are significant 
with the right sign and their means are 0.480 for C1 and 0.486 for C2. C1 has a mean R2 
of 0.223 and C2 of 0.244. In the 13 multiple regressions C1 has 3 significant coefficient 
with the right sign and 1 with the wrong sign, while C2 has 8 significant coefficients, all 
with the right sign, Here the mean of the regression coefficients is 0.208 for C1 and 0.364 
for C2. On all the policy questions and on half of the questions about economic 
parameters C2 has a higher coefficient than C1. Thus C2 has at least as much, if not more 
explanatory power than C1.16 R2 between C1 and C2 is only 0.501, which again shows 
that economists do not follow an ideological party line.17 
VIII. Conclusions 
The glass is neither full nor empty. But it is closer to being full. Whether economists  
support a liberal or a conservative ideology as defined here by questions on value  Table 5 
Regressions of Parameter and Policy Variables on Compound 
Values and Political Efficacy Variables - A.E.A. Sample 
 
I. Simple Regressions 
 
  Adjusted  Regression  T  Number of 
Dependent  R2  Coefficients  Value  Cases 
Variable  C1  C2  C1  C2  C1  C2  C1  C2 
 
A. Economic Parameters 
 
  8  .058  .051  .314  .317  2.5  2.1  102  64 
  9  .374  .368  -.625  -.612  -9.0  -7.0  135  83 
  10  .103  .058  -.330  -.259  -4.1  -2.4  139  88 
  11  .128  .141  -.356  -.333  -3.8  -3.6  116  74 
  12  .283  .305  -.566  -.543  -6.6  -5.5  108  67 
  13  .094  .042  .319  .204  3.7  2.2  135  86 
 
B. Economic Policy 
 
  14  .114  .108  .274  .255  3.9  2.9  134  85 
  15  .156  .243  .472  .577  5.1  5.3  138  87 
  16  .190  .315  .442  .535  5.6  6.3  136  86 
  17  .047  .130  -.294  -.456  -2.7  -3.6  129  80 
  18  .478  .515  -.798  -.810  -11.0  -9.4  133  83 
  19  .237  .266  -.524  -.516  -6.5  -5.6  135  84 
  20  .643  .630  .920  .901  15.7  13.0  137  85 
 
II. Multiple Regressions 
 
C. Economic Parameters 
 
  8  .016  .022  .254  .1  1.0    58 
  9  .367  -.330  -.326  -2.5  -2.4    72 
  10  .010  -.089  -.114  -.6  -.7    76 
  11  .175  -.226  -.169  -1.6  -1.2    64 
  12  .363  -.180  -.472  -1.2  -3.0    60 




  14  .163  .039  .302  .4  2.5    74 
  15  .201  .047  .518  .3  3.0    75 
  16  .285  .053  .486  .4  3.5    74 
  17  .128  .437
c  -.665  2.4
c  -3.5    70 
  18  .519  -.299  -.570  -2.2  -4.1    72 
  19  .207  -.220  -.271  -1.6  -1.9    72 
  20  .690  .490  .535  3.9  4.1  73 
 
 
Note: For definitions of the dependent variables see Table 1. 
a.  C1 is the mean of variables 2, 3 and variable 4 with its sign reversed. 
b.  C2 is the mean of variables 6 and 7 with the signs reversed. 
c.  coefficient has the wrong sign. judgments and government efficacy does tend to influence their estimates of economic 
parameters and policy choices - with judgments about government efficacy playing at 
least as large  role as value judgments. But it explains only a very small part of the 
disagreements among economists about economic parameters, or, at least about the 
parameters discussed here. This is not surprising for two reasons. First, in their value 
judgments economists do not rigidly follow a simple conservative or liberal party line. 
Second, the relation between parameters and policy choices is loose enough, so that 
economists can advocate a concerted set of liberal or conservative policies without 
having to do the same with respect to economic parameters. This does not necessarily 
mean that economists select their parameters entirely, or even largely, on the basis of 
objective scientific evidence. Other biases, such as a wish to defend one's previously 
published positions, a general reluctance to change one's mind, loyalty to a graduate 
school or to friends, a reluctance to read or to accept the work of those on the other side, 
a preference for using either the latest techniques, or else only those simple techniques 
that one already knows, could all play a substantial role. But that is another issue that can 
only be resolved by case studies.18 Appendix 
 
The following letter was mailed to AEA members. A slightly different version was used 




I am currently working on a study of the opinions of economists as a follow-up on the 
Fuchs, Krueger and Poterba paper in the September 1998 JEL. I would therefore greatly 
appreciate it if you could fill out the enclosed questionnaire. I will, of course, keep all 
replies confidential.  In fact, unless you want receive a copy of the results, there is no 
need to provide your name. The survey covers only academic economists, so if you do 
not hold an academic position please check here [_] and return this letter. 
 
I realize that many of the questions are on topics outside your sub-fields, but even so, I 
would value your opinion. In any case, each question provides a "cannot say" option. 
 
If you would prefer to receive an e-mail version of the questionnaire please check here 
[_] and provide your e-mail address. ______________________ 
 










Emeritus Professor of 
Economics, University 
of California, Davis. 
Dear Colleague:  
ENDNOTES 
 
* I am indebted for able research assistance to Jeffrey Lynch and Tod Tullis, and for 
funding to a U.C. Davis Faculty Research Grant. 
 
 
1. The tensions created by discordant beliefs has been studied extensively in psychology 
under the name of "cognitive dissonance theory" (see for instance Aronson, 1980) 
 
2. As David Colander (1994) points out for policy choices one needs to go beyond the 
"science of economics" to what John Neville Keynes called the "art of economics" that 
takes account of political and administrative considerations. 
 
3. For a general discussion of disagreement in economics see Backhouse (1994), 
Colander (1994), Mayer (1994) McCloskey (1994), Woo (1994) 4. One of the reasons it 
is arbitrary is that the number of regressors used is arbitrary and that affects both R2 and 
the t values of the regressors. 
 
5. Another problem is that calculations based on data that ask respondents to report the 
extent of their agreement with certain statements implicitly imposes linear first degree 
homogeneity on the responses.  For example if a respondent chooses the "strongly agree" 
option instead of the "agree" option, that receives an equal weight to a respondent 
choosing the "disagree" option instead of the "strongly disagree" option. 
 
6. Only economists at American institutions were included.  Retired economists who 
listed only a home address were excluded, as were those who listed their current position 
as teaching assistant, or as a visiting appointment. Economists employed by university 
research institutions were included. The Appendix reproduces the covering letter. The 
questions were asked in a different order than is shown in Table 1. A follow-up letter was 
sent to many of those who did not respond to the initial one. Of those responding to the 
relevant questions 94 percent hold a Ph.D. degree, with the mean date of receipt being 
1981. About half (56 percent) teach in business schools, and close to half (45 percent) 
teach in departments with a doctoral program.  Their distribution across departments is as 
follows: economics 74 percent, economics and business 3 percent, agricultural economics 
4 percent, various business departments 9 percent, other departments, 9 percent. These 
variables had virtually no explanatory power with respect to the responses to the 
questions. The highest R2 was 0.077. 
 
7. These are questions 3, 9, 12-14, 16-19. See Frey et al (1984); Kearl et al (1979); Alston 
et al (1992); Ricketts and Shoesmith; 1992) Alston et al (undated). 
 
8. Question 1 used "favor" instead of "agree". Question 7 used "detrimental"and 
"favorable" and Question 20 "larger" and "smaller".  Question 5 asked for a numerical 
answer. 
 9.  A few respondents put marks in between boxes. I recorded these as a value half-way 
in between, except when the mark seemed to be outside the box only unintentionally; 
some questionnaires were sent by e-mail which could have led to misplaced marks. 
 
10. The distinction between normative judgments and positive judgments is subtle. (See 
Fuchs et al, 1998) For example, many economists would probably consider an answer to 
Question 2 (whether enhancing social justice is more important than whether GDP grows 
at a 1.5 percent or at a 2 percent rate) to be a straightforward value judgment. But it also 
involves positive judgments, such as the declining marginal utility of income. 11. I am 
greatly indebted to Victor Fuchs for making these data available to me, and to Deborah 
Kerwin-Peck and Alan Kruger for answering numerous questions about them. For some 
questions about parameters Fuchs et al asked for a best estimate and also for lower and 
upper limits. I used the best estimate, and also adjusted the Fuchs data by omitting two 
outliers for labor economists and five outliers for public economists in the responses 
about economic parameters. These were responses that were either three times greater 
than the mean of the two next highest responses, or less than one third of the two next 
smallest responses. It is quite possible that these respondents made errors in checking the 
questionnaire. Eliminating these outliers should not bias the results since these are 
outliers in the data used for the regressions presented here, and not outliers in these 
regressions themselves. Another difference between the data used here and in Fuchs et al 
(1998) is in the treatment of blanks in the responses. To avoid losing observations Fuchs 
et al used in their regressions (but not in their Table 2) the mean of the regressors in place 
of missing observation. I did not. The resulting difference in the results is sometimes far 
from trivial. 
 
12. I also excluded the question about the effect of minimum wages on employment. A 
few of the questionnaires showed a positive figure, and it is not clear whether the 
respondents think that a rise in the minimum wage would raise employment (the question 
was phrased in terms of employment, not unemployment), or whether they misread the 
question, or took a minus sign as implied in their response. I also excluded the question 
about the effect of unions on productivity since from the way the question is worded it is 
not obvious whether those who think that it is negative used a minus sign. Fuchs et al also 
asked the respondent's political party affiliation. Although this is related to ideology as 
defined here, I have not used this variable because party affiliation is often heavily 
influenced by non-economic issues, such as foreign policy and the legality of abortion. 
 
13. For example, one question asked for the percentage change in GDP if the 1993 
Budget Enforcement Act had been allowed to remain in place, and another question 
asked about the elasticity of the labor supply of men aged 25-45. The regression 
coefficient between the responses would have been very different had the first question 
been phrased in tenth of one percent instead of in percentages. By contrast, in the AEA 
sample respondents were asked to choose between answers ranging from "strongly agree" 
to "strongly disagree", so that all the questions are in comparable units. 
 
14. All regressions are OLS with an (unreported) constant, and were run with TSP 7.0. 
The t values are adjusted for heteroscedastity if this is indicated at the 10 percent level on the Arque-Bera test. A warning is in order; most of the variables are not normally 
distributed. The Arque-Bera test rejects normality at the 5 percent level for the majority 
of the variables in the Fuchs et al survey and for 90 percent of the variables in the AEA 
survey.  
 
15. Neither these correlations, nor the policy correlations discussed below can be used to 
support the ideological-bias hypothesis, since they are consistent with economists being 
unbiased in their professional work. 
 
16. The variance of C2 trivially exceeds that of C1. 
 
17. It is, of course, possible that some respondents' judgments about government efficacy 
are merely a device for hiding their value judgments. But the opposite may also be the 
case. 
 
18. For an attempt to do some of this with respect to the debate about countercyclical 
monetary policy see Mayer (1998). REFERENCES 
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        Simple Regressions of Economic Parameter Variables 
                          A.E.A. Sample 
 
Independent                    Dependent Variable: 
Variables:       8        9       10        11       12       13 
 
                                   Adjusted R2 
 8             --      .000     .053      .000     .031     .128 
 9            .000      --      .059      .055     .402     .004 
10            .053     .059      --       .081     .045     .076 
11            .000     .055     .081       --      .049     .227 
12            .031     .402     .045      .049      --      .000 
13            .128     .004     .076      .227     .000      -- 
 
                            Regression Coefficients: 
 8                    -.030    -.205     -.078    -.167     .298 
 9           -.050      --      .248      .244     .638    -.102 
10           -.297     .262      --       .081     .225    -.286 
11           -.118     .255     .305      --       .262    -.480 
12           -.242     .638     .236      .220      --     -.067 
13            .456    -.109    -.288     -.485    -.072      -- 
 
                                   T Values 
 8                      -.4     -2.7      -1.0     -2.0      4.2 
 9             -.4      --       3.3       2.8      9.1     -1.3 
10            -2.6      3.5       --       3.5      2.5     -3.6 
11            -1.0      2.9      3.4        --      2.2     -6.0 
12            -2.1      8.1      2.5       2.3       --      -.7 
13             4.4     -1.3     -3.5      -5.9      -.7     -- 
 
                                Number of Cases 
 8              --      116      118       104      100      115 
 9             116       --      156       133      122      149 
10             118      156       --       138      122      157 
11             104      133      138        --      107      135 
12             100      122      122       107       --      117 
13             115      149      157       135      117      -- 
 
Note:  For definitions of the variables see Table 1 
                          Appendix Table  A-2 
          Simple Regressions of Economic Parameter Variables 
                           Labor Economists 
 
Independent                 Dependent Variables 
Variable:   1-l     3-l     6-l     7-l     10-l     11-l  
                            Adjusted R2 
 
 1-l         --    .000    .001    .133     .005     .005 
 2-l      (.790)   .000    .037    .143     .020     .063 
 3-l       .000     --     .160    .000     .000     .051 
 4-l       .000   (.493)   .094    .000     .000     .000 
 5-l       .002   (.140)   .000    .000     .037     .021 
 6-l       .001    .160     --    (.108)    .000     .006 
 7-l       .133    .000   (.108)    --      .000     .000 
 8-l       .000    .133   (.236)  (.085)    .000     .010 
 9-l       .107    .000   (.068)  (.735)    .051     .000 
10-l       .005    .000    .000    .000      --      .000 
11-l       .005    .051    .006    .000     .000      -- 
 
                               T- Value 
 
 1-l         --     1.1    -1.0    -3.1      1.1      1.6 
 2-l      (12.9)     .9    -2.0    -5.3      1.4      2.1 
 3-l        1.3      --     2.7      .6       .6      2.0 
 4-l        1.0    (7.4)    2.4      .8       .6       .6 
 5-l        1.1    (2.8)     .1      .5      1.7      1.6 
 6-l        -.7     2.7      --    (2.8)      .2     -1.2 
 7-l       -1.5      .8    (1.8)     --      -.2     -1.5 
 8-l       -2.1     2.6    (2.8)   (4.0)     -.4     -1.5 
 9-l       -1.1     -.2    (2.1)   (7.9)    -1.7       .5 
10-l        1.4      .6      .1     -.2      --       -.2 
11-l        1.4     1.2    -1.0    -1.2      -.2      -- 
 
                           Number of Cases 
 
 1-l         --      49      48      49       51       54 
 2-l         45      42      41      42       43       45 
 3-l         49      56      49      50       55       57 
 4-l         48      56      49      50       54       56 
 5-l         48      55      48      49       53       55 
 6-l         48      49      --      54       52       54 
 7-l         49      50      54      --       52       54 
 8-l         38      39      43      43       42       43 
 9-l         37      38      42      42       39       41 
10-l         51      55      52      52       --       61 
11-l         54      57      54      54       61       -- 
 
Notes: For definitions of variables see Table 2. Parentheses indicate 
questions for which the correlation of responses need not be due to 
ideological influences.                         Appendix Table A-3 
          Simple Regressions of Economic Parameter Variables 
                           Public Economists 
 
                               Dependent Variables 
Independent    1-p      2-p      3-p      4-p      5-p      6-p 
Variables 
 
                                  Adjusted R2 
 
1-p            --     (.004)   (.008)   (.039)    .002     .003 
2-p          (.004)     --     (.411)    .000     .036     .009 
3-p          (.008)   (.411)     --      .037     .024     .009 
4-p          (.039)    .000     .368      --      .000     .000 
5-p           .002     .036     .024     .000      --      .000 
6-p           .003     .009     .001     .000     .000       -- 
 
                                   T-Values 
1-p             --     (1.3)    (1.8)   (-1.8)     1.0     -1.4 
2-p           (1.2)     --      (4.1)     1.0      2.0     -1.4 
3-p           (1.6)    (3.1)       --     2.2      1.5     -1.6 
4-p          (-1.9)      .9      1.5      ---      1.0       .8 
5-p            1.0      1.6      1.4       .9       --      -.8 
6-p           -1.6     -1.7     -2.1      1.0      -.8       -- 
 
                                Number of Cases 
1-p             --       50       47       52       55       47 
2-p             50       --       52       50       51       46 
3-p             47       52       --       46       49       44 
4-p             52       50       46       --       56       47 
5-p             55       51       49       56       --       49 
6-p             47       46       44       47       49       -- 
 
Notes: For definitions of the variables see Table 2 Parentheses indicate 
questions for which a correlation of responses need not be due to 
ideological influence. 
                        Appendix Table A-4 
              Multiple Regressions of Economic Parameters 
                             A.E.A. Sample 
 
                                  Independent Variables: 
          Adjusted 
             R2         8       9      10       11      12       13 
 
Dependent                        Regression Coefficients 
Variables  8        .128         --    .113    -.184    .138    -.310    .394 
 9        .413       .046     --     -.027    .138     .600   -.094 
10        .111      -.141   -.050      ---    .125     .190   -.221 
11        .215       .076    .183     .089      --     .002   -.424 
12        .428      -.144    .668     .115    .002      --     .171 
13        .283       .207   -.119    -.151    -406     .194     -- 
 
                                         T Values 
 
 8                    ---      .6     -1.3      .9     -1.9     3.4 
 9                     .7      --      -.3     1.5      7.4    -1.0 
10                   -1.5     -.3       --     1.0      1.3    -1.7 
11                     .9     1.5      1.0      --       .0    -4.0 
12                   -1.9     7.4      1.3      .0       --     1.7 
13                    2.7    -1.0     -1.7    -4.1      1.7      -- 
 
 
Notes: For definitions of the variables see Table 1. There are 87 cases 
in all regressions. 
                        Appendix Table A-5 
              Multiple Regressions of Economic Parameters 
 
                          A. Labor Economists 
 
Dependent  Adjusted  T Values of Independent Variables:    Number of 
Variables    R2      1-l  3-l   6-l   7-l  10-l  11-l      cases 
 
 1-l       .068       --  1.4   -.3  -1.5    .8  -.5           42 
 2-l       .102       --   .8   -.6  -1.1   1.2   .7           38 
 3-l       .254      1.2   --   2.4    .5    .2  3.5           42 
 4-l       .117      1.1   --   1.7   1.0    .9  2.2           41 
 5-l       .060      1.4   --   -.1   1.5   1.3  1.7           41 
 6-1       .127     -1.1   2.8   --    --   -.6 -2.0           42 
 7-1       .136     -3.1   1.2   --   --     .2 -1.5           43 
 8-l       .000      -.6   1.2   --    --  -1.4 -1.2           34 
 9-l       .179     -1.8  -1.6   --    --  -1.8   .9           32 
10-l       .000       .7    .2  -.7    .3    --  -.4           42 
11-l       .192      -.4   3.5 -1.6  -1.0   -.4   --           42 
 
                          B- Public Economists 
 
                     1-p  2-p   3-p   4-p   5-p   6-p 
 
 1-p       .003       --    --    --    --    .9  -1.5         46 
 2-p       .054      1.3    --    --    --   1.4  -1.8         43 
 3-p       .075       --    --    --   1.8   1.5  -2.6         40  4-p       .075       --    .0   1.3    --    .0   2.3         40 
 5-p       .000       .5    .3    .7   -.1    --   -.4         38 
 6-p       .061      -.9   -.6   -.5   1.9   -.4    --         38 
 
-- denotes variables excluded from the regression. 
 
Note: For the definitions of the variables see Table 2 
                        Appendix Table A-6 
       Simple Regressions of Economic Parameters on Values 
         and Political-Economy Variables - A.E.A. Sample 
 
                          Dependent Variable: 
              8       9      10       11      12       13 
Independent 
Variable: 
                             Adjusted R2 
1          .000    .057    .117     .077    .038     .130 
2          .069    .215    .115     .120    .077     .146 
3          .051    .179    .104     .054    .168     .033 
4          .032    .315    .038     .107    .244     .042 
5          .000    .085    .000     .000    .003     .000 
6          .046    .298    .064     .060    .299     .000 
7          .038    .208    .110     .171    .134     .117 
 
                       Regression Coefficients 
1         -.119    .309     .402    .324    .263    -.424 
2          .303   -.421    -.308   -.306   -.262     .347 
3          .222   -.341    -.254   -.187   -.333     .152 
4         -.218    .502     .179    .283    .447    -.188 
5          .002   -.017    -.001    .001   -.007     .003 
6         -.285    .518     .253    .213    .508    -.064 
7         -.242    .414     .298    .359    .334    -.301 
 
                              T Values 
1           -.8     3.7      4.0     3.0     2.0     -4.2 
2           2.9    -6.3     -4.5    -3.9    -3.1      4.9 
3           2.6    -5.8     -4.3    -2.7    -4.9      2.2 
4          -2.1     8.5      2.7     3.8     6.3     -2.6 
5            .2    -3.0      -.2      .1    -1.1       .4 
6          -2.1     6.2      2.9     2.5     5.4      -.8 
7          -2.2     5.9      4.2     5.2     3.8     -4.3 
 
                           Number of Cases 
1           102     137      141     120    106       137 
2           109     144      150     125    114       146 
3           113     148      153     129    117       146 4           114     154      159     133    119       152 
5            62      77       78      64     68        76 
6            68      90       94      80     72        92 
7           108     144      149     125    112       143 
 
 
Notes:  For definitions of the variables see Table 1. 
                        Appendix Table A-7 
   Simple Regressions of Economic Parameters on Value Variables 
 
                       A - Labor Economists 
 
                           Dependent Variables: 
                 1-l    3-l    6-l     7-l    10-l    11-l 
Independent 
Variable: 
                               Adjusted R2 
v-1             .121   .021    .045   .104    .000    .098 
v-2             .208   .000    .000   .141    .000    .065 
v-3             .011   .051    .015   .033    .000    .036 
v-4             .171   .068    .000   .008    .000    .103 
 
                                 T Values 
v-1              2.0    1.5    -1.7   -2.7      .6     3.3 
v-2              2.2     .6    -1.0   -2.3      .4     2.9 
v-3             -1.6   -2.0     1.3   -2.5     -.4    -2.1 
v-4              2.5    2.4     -.4   -1.2      .0     2.9 
 
                              Number of Cases 
v-1               54     57      55     55       61     64 
v-2               46     51      48     48       54     56 
v-3               54     57      55     55       61     64 
v-4               50     54      51     51       57     59 
 
                      B - Public Economists 
 
                 1-p    2-p     3-p    4-p      5-p    6-p 
 
                               Adjusted R2 
v-1             .000   .000    .041   .037     .000   .000 
v-2             .000   .000    .000   .000     .000   .001 
v-3             .000   .000    .074   .009     .000   .000 
v-4             .206   .000    .137   .000     .047   .000 
 
                                 T Values 
v-1              -.6    0.2    -2.4   -1.8      -.4    1.2 v-2              -.6    1.3    -1.1    -.5       .1    1.6 
v-3               .7     .4     2.3    1.4       .4    -.4 
v-4             -3.5   -1.1    -3.2   -1.0     -1.8     .7 
 
                              Number of Cases 
v-1               57     56      53     58       60     54 
v-2               56     56      53     57       59     54 
v-3               53     52      49     54       56     50 
v-4               49     47      45     49       53     46 
 
Note: For defintions of the variables see Table 2 
                        Appendix Table A-8 
           Multiple Regressions of Economic Parameters on Values 
              and Political-Economy Variables - A.E.A. Sample 
 
                                    Independent Variables: 
            Adjusted       1      2      3      4      5     6      7 
Dependent      R2 
Variable: 
                                   Regression Coefficients 
 
 8          .064       -.206   .285   .249   .159  -.036  .105  -.022 
 9          .316        .019  -.190   .123   .249  -.013  .434  -.137 
10          .126        .393  -.098  -.192  -.505   .013  .217   .105 
11          .161        .088   .320  -.050   .338  -.011 -.157   .110 
12          .455       -.060   .191  -.044   .564  -.008  .610  -.398 
13          .091       -.256  -.065   .015  -.082  -.011  .191  -.352 
 
            Number of                      T Va1ues 
            cases 
 8            32         -.8     .9    1.0     .5   -2.5    .4    -.1 
 9            40          .1   -1.2     .8    1.2   -1.5   2.7    -.7 
10            40         2.0    -.6   -1.2   -2.5    1.5   1.2     .5 
11            32          .5    2.0    -.4    1.8   -1.3  -1.1     .6 
12            37         -.3    1.2    -.3    3.0    -.9   3.6   -1.9 
13            40        -1.5    -.4     .1    -.5   -1.4   1.2   -1.9 
 
Notes:  For definitions of the variables see Table 1. 
                            Table  A-9 
  Multiple Regressions of Economic Parameter Estimates on Values 
 
Dependent   Adjusted 
Variable       R2         Independent Variables      Number of 
                                                     Cases 
                         1-v     2-v     3-v     4-v 
                        A - Labor Economists 
 
                               T Values 
 1-l       .282          1.1      .9     1.0     1.4     42 
 3-l       .052           .2     -.9    -1.3     1.8     48 
 6-l       .061         -1.8      .7      .0     2.1     44 
 7-l       .086          -.7    -1.1     -.6      .9     44 
10-l       .000          1.1     -.4     -.5    -1.1     50 
11-l       .068           .5     -.1      .4     1.9     51 
 
                       B - Public Economists 
 
1-p        .232           1.3    -1.2    -.6    -3.4     46 
2-p        .009            .5     1.4     .6    -1.2     45 
3-p        .117           -.1     1.3    1.0    -1.7     43 
4-p        .099          -2.7     2.2    -.1      .7     46 
5-p        .020            .9      .3    -.7    -2.0     50 
6-p        .000            .9      .4     .1     -.9     45 
 
Note: For  definitions of the variables see Table 2. 
                       Appendix Table A-10 
   Simple Regressions of Normative and Political-Economy Variables 
                            A.E.A. Sample 
 
                                 Dependent Variable: 
Independent     1        2        3       4       5       6       7 
Variable: 
                                    Adjusted R2 
 1            --      .194     .051    .057    .006    .076    .096 
 2           .194      --      .228    .257    .092    .188    .350 
 3           .051     .228      --     .357    .048    .191    .270 
 4           .057     .257     .357     --     .163    .285    .306 
 5           .006     .092     .048    .163     --     .190    .051 
 6           .076     .188     .191    .285    .190     --     .407 
 7           .096     .350     .270    .306    .051    .407      -- 
 
                              Regression Coefficients 
 1            --     -.588    -.365    .350  -3.733    .363    .437 
 2          -.341      --      .557   -.526   5.996   -.412   -.603 
 3          -.159     .419      --    -.530   3.799   -.366   -.457 
 4           .183    -.497    -.681     --   -7.355    .510    .552 
 5          -.005     .017     .016   -.024     --    -.028   -.014 
 6           .241    -.481    -.548    .575   -7.30     --     .682 
 7           .235    -.589    -.603    .563   -4.53    .607     -- 
 
                                      T Values  1            --      -6.7     -2.8     3.5    -1.2     2.8     4.0 
 2           -4.8       --      6.6    -7.2     2.9    -4.5    -8.8 
 3           -2.7      6.4      --     -9.1     2.0    -4.6    -7.3 
 4            2.8     -7.2     -9.2     --     -4.0     6.1     8.1 
 5           -1.3      3.2      2.1    -3.9     --     -3.4    -2.2 
 6            3.0     -4.5     -4.6     6.1    -3.4     --      7.8 
 7            3.6     -8.8     -7.3     8.1    -2.2     7.8     -- 
 
                                  Number of Cases 
 1             --      133      136     138      76      81     132 
 2            133       --      145     147      75      85     142 
 3            136      145       --     151      75      86     144 
 4            138      147      151      --      75      92     148 
 5             76       75       75      75      --      46      74 
 6             81       85       86      92      46      --      88 
 7            132      142      144     148      74      88      -- 
 
Note: For definitions of the variables see Table 1. The regression 
coefficients for variable 5 must be interpreted with caution since 
the units differ; for all other variables the range is 1 to 5, 
while for variable 5 the potential range is 0 to 100. 
 
a. All regression coefficient are significant at the 5 percent 
                       Appendix Table A-11 
              Simple Regressions of Value Judgments 
 
                      I. Simple Regressions 
 
                                Dependent Variables 
              1-v    2-v    3-v    4-v       1-v     2-v    3-v    4-v 
 




                                   Adjusted R2 
1-v           --    .685   .491   .514       --     .691   .562   .536 
2-v          .685    --    .258   .451      .691     --    .305   .357 
3-v          .491   .258    --    .265      .562    .305    --    .583 
4-v          .514   .451   .265     --      .536    .357   .583     -- 
                                     T Values 
1-v           --    11.1   -7.4    7.1        --    12.8   -9.0    9.0 
2-v          11.8    --    -4.5    7.2       11.9    --    -5.3    5.7 
3-v          -6.5   -4.5    --    -3.8       -9.0   -5.3    --    -8.8 
4-v           7.0    6.5   -4.7    --         8.2    5.7   -8.8    -- 
                                    Number of Cases 
1-v            --     57     65     60        --      68     63     58 
2-v            57     --     57     52        68      --     62     57 
3-v            65     57     --     60        63      62     --     56 
4-v            60     52     60     --        58      57     56     -- 
 
                       II.  Multiple Regressions 
 
                            Labor Economists 
 
Dependent     Adjusted       Independent Variables 
Variable:        R2     1-v      2-v      3-v      4-v 
                                   T Values 
1-v           .803     --        5.8     -3.1      3.0 
2-v           .671      5.8       --      1.1       .8 
3-v           .503     -4.2      1.2       --     -1.8 
4-v           .624      2.7       .7     -1.6      -- 
 
                           Public Economists 
 
1-v           .790      --      7.3      -3.3      1.2 
2-v           .681      8.0      --       1.0       .7 
3-v           .636     -3.3     1.4        --     -4.1 
4-v           .607      1.2      .8      -4.1       -- 
 
 
Notes: For questions see T-2. For labor economists there are 52 cases 
and for public economists 55. 
                       Appendix Table A-12 
     Multiple Regressions of Value and Political Economy Variables 
                             A.E.A. Sample 
 
Dependent                            Independent Variable 
Variable   Adjusted     1        2      3      4      5      6      7 
           R2                       Regression Coefficients: 
 
   1      .000        ---    -.040  -.063   .155  -.004   .159  -.192 
   2      .363      -.050      ---   .299  -.063   .002  -.046  -.278 
   3      .487      -.096     .358    ---  -.505   .005   .078  -.182 
   4      .544       .144    -.046  -.309    ---   .002   .049   .410 
   5      .000     -1.819     .694  1.535   .855    --- -3.149 -1.403 
   6      .380       .186    -.042   .060   .061  -.008   ---    .551 
   7      .604      -.157    -.179  -.098   .360  -.003   .387    --- 
 
                                            T Values 
    1                  ---      -.3    -.7      .8   -.6    1.0    -.7 
   2                  -.3      ---    2.0     -.3    .2    -.3   -1.3 
   3                  -.4      2.0    ---    -2.5    .5     .4    -.8 
   4                   .9      -.3   -2.5     ---    .2     .3    2.4 
   5                  -.5       .2     .5      .2    -3    -.9    -.3 
   6                  1.0      -.3     .4      .3   -.9    ---    3.0 
   7                 -1.0     -1.3    -.8     2.4   -.3    3.0    --- 
 
Notes: For definitions of the variables see Table 1.  There are 40 cases 
in all regressions. 
level, except the coefficient of variable 1 on variable 5. 
                       Appendix Table A-13 
              Simple Regressions of Policy Variables 
                          A.E.A. Sample 
 
                                  Dependent Variable: 
Independent    14       15       16       17       18       19      20 
Variable: 
                                    Adjusted R2 
14            --      .035      .072    .000     .099     .085    .143 
15           .035      ---      .263    .141     .240     .205    .248 
16           .072     .263      ---     .113     .237     .174    .334 
17           .000     .141      .113     ---     .103     .099    .117 
18           .099     .240      .237    .103      ---     .231    .587 
19           .085     .205      .174    .099     .231      ---    .274 
20           .143     .248      .334    .117     .587     .274     -- 
 
                               Regression Coefficients 
14            --      .296      .341   -.090    -.470    -.397    .543 
15           .140       --      .428   -.417    -.490    -.419    .496 
16           .230     .624        --   -.452    -.593    -.461    .680 
17          -.038    -.353     -.264     --      .306     .275   -.311 
18          -.225    -.499     -.408    .358      --      .445   -.761 
19          -.230    -.501     -.389    .385     .530      --    -.570 
20           .274     .510      .498   -.396    -.775    -.489     -- 
 
                                       T Values 
14             --      2.6       4.6     -.6     -4.9     -3.9     6.6 
15            2.3       --       7.5    -5.4     -7.0     -6.4     7.2 
16            3.8      7.5       --     -4.7     -7.0     -6.6     8.8 
17            -.7     -5.1      -4.2      --      4.0      3.9    -4.3 
18           -3.9     -7.0      -7.0     4.0       --      6.8  - 15.4 
19           -4.0     -6.4      -5.6     4.0      6.8       --    -7.7 
20            4.5      7.2       8.8    -4.6    -16.3     -7.7     -- 
 
                                    Number of Cases 14             --      153       151     143      146      151      150 
15            153       --       157     147      152      156      155 
16            151      157        --     145      154      155      154 
17            143      147       145      --      141      143      144 
18            146      152       154     141       --      152      151 
19            151      156       155     143      152      --       154 
20            150      155       154     144      151      154       -- 
 
 
Notes:  For definitions of the variables see Table 1. 
                       Appendix Table A-14 
              Simple Regressions of Policy Variables 
 
                       A - Labor Economists 
 
Independent                  Dependent Variables 
Variables      12-l     13-l     14-l     15-l     16-l     17-l 
                                 Adjusted R2 
12-l            --     .002    .065     .173       .297     .136 
13-l           .002     --     .042     .079       .113     .000 
14-l           .065    .042     --      .226       .134     .200 
15-l           .173    .079    .226      --        .477     .256 
16-l           .297    .113    .134     .477        --      .122 
17-l           .136    .000    .200     .256       .122       -- 
                                  T Values 
12-l            --      1.1    -2.3      3.7       -5.2       3.2 
13-l            1.1     --     -1.8      2.5       -2.9        .1 
14-l           -2.3    -1.9     --      -3.8        3.3      -3.9 
15-l            3.7     2.5    -4.4      --        -7.6       4.5 
16-l           -5.2    -2.9     3.0     -7.6         --      -3.0 
17-l            3.2      .1    -3.9      4.5       -3.0       -- 
                               Number of Cases 
12-l             --      59      62       62         62        58 
13-l             59      --      60       60         60        56 
14-l             62      60      --       63         63        57 
15-l             62      60      63       --         63        57 
16-l             62      60      63       63         --        57 
17-l             58      56      57       57         57        -- 
 
                      B - Public Economists 
 
Independent              Dependent Variables 
Variables        7-p    8-p     9-p     10-p      11-p 
                                Adjusted R2 
 7-p              --   .049    .099     .165      .064 
 8-p            .049    --     .000     .000      .000  9-p            .099   .000     --      .138      .045 
10-p            .165   .000    .138      --       .026 
11-p            .064   .000    .045     .026       -- 
 
                               T Values 
 7-p              --   -2.1      2.9    -3.7      -2.6 
 8-p            -2.1    --        .0      .7        .7 
 9-p             2.8     .0       --    -3.4       2.0 
10-p            -3.7     .7     -3.4     --        1.6 
11-p            -2.5     .7     -2.0     1.6       -- 
 
                           Number of Cases 
 7-p              --     66       64      66        63 
 8-p              66     --       65      67        64 
 9-p              64     65       --      66        63 
10-p              66     67       66      --        64 
11-p              63     64       63      64        -- 
 
Note: For definitions of the variables see Table 2 
                       Appendix Table A-15 
               Multiple Regressions of Policy Variables 
                             A.E.A. Sample 
 
Dependent                        Independent Variables: 
Variable    Adjusted 
               R2       14     15     16     17     18     19     20 
 
                                 Regression Coefficients 
 
14          .152       --   -.004   .119   .069  -.004  -.097   .223 
15          .417     -.005    --    .299  -.103  -.238  -.268   .048 
16          .373      .117   .224    --   -.082   .018  -.066   .285 
17          .129      .156  -.177  -.188    --    .179   .140   .051 
18          .623     -.004  -.152   .016   .066    --    .111  -.659 
19          .340     -.116  -.245  -.080   .074   .159    --   -.107 
20          .641      .164   .027   .213   .017  -.579   -.066   -- 
 
                                         T Values 
 
14           126       ---    0.0    1.3    1.1    0.0   -1.3    2.5 
15           126       0.0    ---    2.9   -1.5   -2.1   -2.9     .4 
16           126       1.3    2.9    ---   -1.4     .2    -.8    2.8 
17           126       1.1   -1.6   -1.3    ---    1.3    1.0     .3 
18           126       0.0   -2.2     .2    1.3    ---    1.4   -7.5 
19           126      -1.2   -2.9    -.8    1.1    1.5    ---    -.9 
20           126       2.5     .4    3.1     .3   -6.6    -.8    ---  
Notes: For definitions of the variables see Table 1. 
                       Appendix Table A-16 
            Multiple  Regressions of Policy Variables 
 
                       A - Labor Economists 
 
Dependent    Adjusted            Independent Variables 
Variable:      R2       12-l   13-l   14-l   15-l   16-l   17-l 
 
                                        T Values 
12-l          .266        --    -.1    -.1    -.1   -2.7    1.3 
13-l          .291       -.1     --   -2.6     .8   -2.2   -3.0 
14-l          .344       -.1   -2.6    --    -1.1    -.6   -3.1 
15-l          .540       -.1     .8   -1.1     --   -3.9    2.1 
16-l          .561      -2.7   -2.2    -.6   -3.9    --     -.7 
17-l          .441       1.3   -3.0   -3.1    2.1    -.7    -- 
 
                      B - Public Economists 
 
Dependent   Adjusted          Independent Variables 
Variable:      R2        7-p    8-p    9-p   10-p    11-p 
 
                                   T Values 
 7-p          .219        --   -1.8    1.3   -2.2    -1.5 
 8-p          .000      -1.6     --     .6     .2     -.1 
 9-p          .157       1.3     .5     --   -1.9    -1.1 
10-p          .222      -2.3     .2   -2.3     --     1.0 
11-p          .079      -1.4    -.1   -1.1    1.0     -- 
 
Notes: For definitions of the variables see Table 2. There are 53 
cases for labor economists and 60 for public economists. 
 Table 1 
Responses to the AEA Survey 
 
  Mean  S.D.  N 
1. Suppose technical change would  raise the level of 
output permanently by 2%, but would cause a totally 
arbitrary 5% redistribution within each income decile, 
while leaving the distribution between quintiles 
unchanged. Would you favor this development? [Strongly 
favor ... Strongly disfavor]
a  1.9  1.0  142 
 
2. Whether GDP grows at 1.5% or 2%  is not nearly as 
 important as enhancing social justice. (C)  3.3  1.4  152 
 
3. The government has a moral right to redistribute 
income if a majority supports this. (C)  2.9  1.6  156 
 
4. Maintaining or preferably enhancing freedom from 
government control should be the main goal of economic 
policy (L)  3.1  1.4  161 
 
5. While it is hard to generalize about the many 
government programs involved, by and large, if the 
government adopts a program to help the lowest 
income quintile I would expect that roughly speaking 
-- % of the benefits would go to the upper half of the 
income distribution instead of the lowest quintile. (C)  46.4  24.4  78 
 
6. In general, the law of unanticipated consequences 
ensures that most programs that are intended to help 
the poor harm them more than they help them. (L)  03.2  1.3  95 
 
7. Government intervention that would substantially 
reduce the inequality of the income distribution would 
have major social and political effects. On the whole, 
these effects would be [Strongly detrimental .. Strongly 
favorable] (L)  3.0  1.4  150 
 
8. A $50 billion rise in government expenditures with 
no accompanying change in the money supply is more 
expansionary over a 5 year period than is a $50 billion 
increase in the money supply with no change in fiscal 
policy. (C)   3.2  1.4  119 
 
9. A 10 percent cut across the board in income tax rates 
would substantially increase work effort. (L)  3.6  1.2  158  
10. Product markets in the U.S. are better described as 
competitive than oligopolistic, (L)  2.5  1.2  164 
 
11. Speculation in foreign exchange markets is 
beneficial because it is usually stabilizing rather than 
destabilizing. (L)  2.7  1.2  137 
 
12. Halving the capital gains tax rate would raise the 
economic growth rate by 0.25 or more. (L)  3.5  1.3  124 
 
13. Financial markets generate serious misallocations of 
resources because stock prices are dominated by short- 
term returns, and long-term consequences tend to be 
neglected. (C)  3.8  1.2  157 
 
14. It is better to aim for a balanced budget over the 
business cycle rather than yearly. (C)  1.6  .9  157 
 
15. Industrial policy(that is government support for 
innovative industries) should not be dismissed out 
of hand, but deserves serious consideration. (C)  3.3  1.4  162 
 
16. An increase in unionization is desirable. (C)  3.6  1.2  161 
 
17. Trade in human organs for transplants should be 
permitted. (L)  3.0  1.5  150 
 
18. Government spending as a percent of GDP should be 
reduced. (L)  2.8  1.4  156 
 
19. The prime concern of macropolicy should be to hold 
down inflation. (L)  2.9  1.3  160 
 
20. Compared to the current situation, the federal 
government's role in the income distribution should be 
[Larger .. Smaller] (C)  3.0  1.4  160 
 
 
Note: Unless otherwise indicated the respondents were presented with five 
boxes ranging from : "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree".  The letter 
in parenthesis indicates whether it is conservatives or liberals who are 
assumed to assign a high value to this parameter when measured on a scale 
ranging from "strongly oppose" to "strongly favor". 
 
a. Responses cannot be classified as conservative or liberal. Table 2 
 
Condensed Versions of the Questions in Surveys of Specialists 
 
 
A.  Values - Labor Economists and Public Economists 
 
Does the government play too large or too small a role in income 
  redistribution? (L) [1-v] 
Same as the previous question on the assumption the that redistribution 
  would have no distortionary effects. (L) [2-v] 
Should policy place more weight on equity or on efficiency than it does 
  now?  (C) [3-v] 
Should policy give more weight to individual or to social responsibility 
  than it does now? (L) [4-v] 
 
B.  Economic Parameters - Labor Economists 
 
Total wage elasticity of labor demand? (C) [1-l] 
Output constant wage elasticity of labor demand? (C) [2-l] 
Percent impact on earnings of youths of JTPA job training? (L) [3-l] 
Percent impact on earnings of adult males of JTPA job training? (L) 
  [4-l] 
Percent impact on earnings of adult females of JTPA job training? (L) 
  [5-l] 
Uncompensated elasticity of labor supply for men aged 25-54? (C) [6-l] 
Uncompensated elasticity of labor supply for women aged 25-54? (C) [7-l] 
Compensated elasticity of labor supply for men aged 25-54? (C) [8-l] 
Compensated elasticity of labor supply for women aged 25-54? (C) [9-l] 
Percent impact of unions on the earnings of their members? (L) [10-l] 
Percent of male-female wage gap due to employer discrimination? (L) [11] 
 
C.  Economic Parameters - Public Economists 
 
Change in the GDP growth rate if all capital income taxes were replaced 
  by a revenue-neutral wage tax? (C) [1-p] 
Uncompensated  elasticity of labor supply for men aged 25-54? (C) [2-p] 
Compensated elasticity of labor supply for men aged 25-54? (C) [3-p] 
Percent of inflows to IRA's that are net additions to saving? (C) [4-p] 
Personal saving ratio in the absence of Social Security? (C) [5-p] 
Ratio of administrative costs of mandatory private retirement accounts 
  to the administrative costs of Social Security? (L) [6-p] 
 
D.  Policy Recommendations- Labor Economistsa 
 
Increase AFDC benefits financed by a proportional increase in marginal   income tax rates. (L) [12-l] 
Eliminate the OASI cap on  taxable wages, offset by a revenue-neutral 
  reduction in payroll tax rates (L) [13-l] 
Eliminate the OFCCP Affirmative Action Program (C) [14-l] 
Increase the minimum wage from $4.25 to $5.15 over two years (L) [15-l] 
Eliminate the federal role in job training programs and apply the 
  savings to debt reduction. (C) [16-1] 
Change the law to permit workers to form union if a majority of workers 
  in the bargaining unit sign cards. (L)  [17-7] 
 
E.  Policy Recommendations - Public Economistsa 
 
Increase AFDC benefits financed by a proportional increase in marginal 
  income tax rates. (L) [7-p] 
Replace individual and corporate income tax and estate tax with a 
  revenue neutral value-added tax. (C) [8-p] 
Eliminate the cap on taxable wages under OASI with an offsetting 
  reduction in the payroll tax rate. (C) [9-p] 
Raise the maximum IRA contribution to $5000 and restore "up front" tax 
  deductions of IRA contributions for everyone. (C) [10-p] 
Replace part of the current payroll tax with a mandatory self-directed 
  savings program, annuitized at retirement. (C) [11-p] 
 
 
NOTE: These are summaries of the questions. For the complete questions 
see Fuchs et al (1998) The letter in parenthesis indicates whether it is 
conservatives or liberals who are assumed to assign a high value to this 
parameter when measured on a scale ranging from "strongly oppose" to 
"strongly favor" on the policy questions, and  from "much less" to "much 
greater" on the value questions (except for question 4-v where the range 
is from "individual responsibility" to "public responsibility.") The 
symbol in brackets is the designation used for this question in the 
subsequent tables. 
 
a. Choices ranged from "strongly oppose" to "strongly favor".` 
 
Source: Fuchs et al (1998) pp. 1416-23. 
 
 Table 3 
 
Summary of Results for Simple Regressions 
 
 
  Percent of  Mean absolute  Mean 
  Coefficients  value of  Adjusted 
  significant and  significant  R2b 
  with sign:a  coefficients 
  right  wrong  with right 
    sign
a 
 
A.  Economic parameters 
  regressed on each other: 
  AEA sample  73%  0%  .248  .081 
  Labor economists  2  16  --  .011 
  Public economists  14  0  --  .028 
B.  Economic Parameters 
  regressed on 
  ideological variables: 
  AEA samplec  83  0  .259  .107 
  Labor economists  29  12  --  .040 
  Public economists  17  0  --  .026 
C. Ideological variables: 
  regressed on each other: 
  AEA samplec  97  0  .434  .228 
  Labor economists  100  0  --  .650 
  Public economists  100  0  --  .444 
D. Policy variables: 
  regressed on each other: 
  AEA sample  95  0  .413  181 
  Labor economists  77  3  --  .144 





--  denotes not computed because of incommensurability of the variables. 
a.  Significant at the 5 percent level. For labor and public economists denominator of 
the ratio excludes coefficients with a t of zero. 
b.  Excludes simple regressions in which the coefficient has the wrong sign. 
c.  Excludes question 1, and for the mean of coefficients question 5. Table 4 
 




  Percent of regressions  Adjusted 
  in which 67% or more  R2
a 
  of the coefficients 
  have right signs.
a 
 
A.  Economic parameters 
  regressed on each other: 
  AEA sample  67%  263 
  Labor economists  9  .093 
  Public economists  83  .045 
B.  Economic Parameters 
  regressed on ideological variables: 
  AEA samplec  67  .202 
  Labor economists  20  .052 
  Public economists  17  .090 
C.  Ideological variables regressed 
  on each other: 
  AEA sample  100  .396 
  Labor economists  100  .650 
  Public economists  100  .678 
D.  Policy variables regressed 
  on each other: 
  AEA sample  100  .382 
  Labor economists  50  .407 
  Public economists  60  .130 
 
 
a.  Excludes regressions in which more than half the coefficients have the wrong 
sign. 
 
b.  Excludes coefficients with a t value of less than 0.1.   
 
c.  Excludes question 1. Table 5 
Regressions of Parameter and Policy Variables on Compound  
Values and Political Efficacy Variables  - A.E.A. Sample 
 
I. Simple Regressions 
 
  Adjusted  Regression  T  Number of 
Dependent  R2  Coefficients  Value  Cases 
Variable  C1  C2  C1  C2  C1  C2  C1  C2 
 
A. Economic Parameters 
 
  8  .058  .051  .314  .317  2.5  2.1  102  64 
  9  .374  .368  -.625  -.612  -9.0  -7.0  135  83 
  10  .103  .058  -.330  -.259  -4.1  -2.4  139  88 
  11  .128  .141  -.356  -.333  -3.8  -3.6  116  74 
  12  .283  .305  -.566  -.543  -6.6  -5.5  108  67 
  13  .094  .042  .319  .204  3.7  2.2  135  86 
 
B. Economic Policy 
 
  14  .114  .108  .274  .255  3.9  2.9  134  85 
  15  .156  .243  .472  .577  5.1  5.3  138  87 
  16  .190  .315  .442  .535  5.6  6.3  136  86 
  17  .047  .130  -.294  -.456  -2.7  -3.6  129  80 
  18  .478  .515  -.798  -.810  -11.0  -9.4  133  83 
  19  .237  .266  -.524  -.516  -6.5  -5.6  135  84 
  20  .643  .630  .920  .901  15.7  13.0  137  85 
 
II. Multiple Regressions 
 
C. Economic Parameters 
 
  8  .016  .022  .254  .1  1.0    58 
  9  .367  -.330  -.326  -2.5  -2.4    72 
  10  .010  -.089  -.114  -.6  -.7    76 
  11  .175  -.226  -.169  -1.6  -1.2    64 
  12  .363  -.180  -.472  -1.2  -3.0    60 




  14  .163  .039  .302  .4  2.5    74 
  15  .201  .047  .518  .3  3.0    75 
  16  .285  .053  .486  .4  3.5    74 
  17  .128  .437
c  -.665  2.4
c  -3.5    70 
  18  .519  -.299  -.570  -2.2  -4.1    72 
  19  .207  -.220  -.271  -1.6  -1.9    72 
  20  .690  .490  .535  3.9  4.1  73 
 
 
Note: For definitions of the dependent variables see Table 1.  
a.  C1 is the mean of variables 2, 3 and variable 4 with its sign reversed.  
b.  C2 is the mean of variables 6 and 7 with the signs reversed.  
c.  coefficient has the wrong sign. 